This Article critically considers the effectiveness of the European Union's (EU) counter-terrorist financing (CTF) strategies. In particular, it concentrates on the use of financial intelligence gathered from the submission of suspicious activity reports (SARs) by reporting entities to Member States Financial Intelligence Units (FIU). The Article identifies a series of weaknesses in the United Kingdom's (UK) reporting regime: Defensive reporting, increased compliance costs, and the definition of suspicion. It concludes by making a series of recommendations that are aimed at improving the effectiveness of the EU and UK CTF reporting obligations. * Dr. Ryder is a Professor in Financial Crime at Bristol Law School and Faculty of Business and Law at the University of the West of England, Bristol.
1 1 7 2 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 19 No. 05
[should have] otherwise [been] reported to law enforcement." 9 This conclusion is perhaps best explained by the inherent inadequacy of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 in curtailing terrorist financing. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was not meant to tackle the problem terrorist financing and was instead introduced to "build a system to combat organized crime and white-collar crime and to deter and prevent the use of secret foreign bank accounts for tax fraud." 10 Prior to the terrorist attacks, terrorist financing had attracted limited attention in a number of academic studies. For example, researchers in the US had concentrated their efforts on assessing the prevention of other types of financial crimes, including money laundering 11 and fraud. 12 The evolution of the US literature on money laundering can be traced and presented in chronological order through the enactment of legislation: the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 13 the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970, 14 the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 15 the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992, 16 and the USA Patriot Act of 2001. 17 A similar picture can be presented of the approach adopted by researchers of financial crime policies and legislative provisions of the EU. A plethora of research has been published on the EUs AML Directives, 18 the EU's counter-fraud measures under the management of the European Anti-Fraud Office, 19 market manipulation, 20 insider dealing, 21 and market abuse.
22
The terrorist attacks in September 2001 resulted in the publication of numerous interesting studies on the threat posed by the financing of terrorism. For example, commentators began to take an interest in the funding models used by al-Qaeda, 23 the association between misapplied charitable donations and terrorists, 24 the interpretation of the Financial War on Terrorism, and the efforts by the international community to tackle terrorist financing. 25 More recently, scholars have concentrated on the funding streams of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 26 While the association between the EU and the financing of terrorism has attracted some academic commentary, a large proportion of it has concentrated on other types of financial crimes and only a small number of studies have reviewed the EUs stance on terrorist financing. 27 Normark and Ranstrop noted that none of the published research on terrorist financing in the EU has presented a "high-resolution picture of the sources of funding for terrorist plots."
28 Therefore, this Article seeks to provide an enhanced understanding of the weaknesses of the EU's CTF reporting obligations, the continued threat posed by inexpensive acts of terrorism, and the extensive array of sources that fund acts of terrorism. 
B. International Financial Crime Legislative Measures: The Profit Model

I. The Profit Model
Before 9/11, international efforts against financial crime focused on tackling the laundering of the proceeds from the illegal manufacturing, distribution, and sale of narcotic substances. These measures largely originate from the US led War on Drugs, a term commonly associated with a series of controversial legislative measures introduced by President Richard Nixon in the 1970s. 29 The UN adopted these legislative measures in the form of the The FATF published its first set of money laundering Recommendations in 1990. 32 Collectively, these measures were described as a "major breakthrough in attacking the benefits derived from drug trafficking activities and . . . a forceful endorsement of the notion that attacking the profit motive is essential if the struggle against drug trafficking is to be effective."
33 Nelen stated that "by dismantling their organi[z]ations financially, criminals must be hit at their supposedly more vulnerable spot: [T]heir assets."
34 Nevertheless, the profit driven model is not appropriate when used against the financing of terrorism. The financial process adopted by terrorists to accumulate funds is different from the processes adopted by money launderers. Terrorist financing is more commonly referred to as reverse money laundering, where clean or legitimate money is transformed into dirty money that is then funneled to finance acts of terrorism. Comparatively, regular money laundering involves the conversion of dirty or illegal money into clean money via its laundering through three recognized phases: Placement, layering, and integration. Therefore, the extension of the profit model to tackle the financing of terrorism is inappropriate. Nonetheless, the profit driven model contains a number of preventative measures that require the reporting entities of signatory states to implement a series of pre-placement money laundering reporting obligations. For example, Article 7 of the Palermo Convention of 2000 provides that each signatory should implement a far-reaching AML regime for a wide range of reporting entities that are vulnerable to money laundering. The scheme should include requirements for customer identification, record keeping, and the reporting of suspicious transactions. 35 Furthermore, it provides that signatories shall "consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national center for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money laundering." 36 Additionally, the FATF Recommendations outline a number of preventative measures aimed at tackling the threat posed by money laundering. 37 For example, Recommendations 10 and 11 relate to customer due diligence and record keeping obligations. 38 Recommendations 12 to 16 provide additional measures for specific customers and activities, which include politically exposed persons, correspondent banking, money or transfer value services, new technology, and wire transfers. 39 by the UN. 42 It was not until the introduction of the First Money Laundering Directive that there was a coordinated effort to impose the profit model on Member States. 43 The Directive contained several important features based upon 40 recommendations from the FATF which included the need to ensure client identification, the examination and reporting of suspicious transactions, indemnities for good faith reporting of suspicious transactions, storage of identification records extending for five years beyond the end of the client relationship, co-operation with the authorities, and the adoption of adequate internal procedures and training programs. Nevertheless, the First Money Laundering Directive concentrated on combating the laundering of drug proceeds though the financial sector instead of combating the financing of terrorism. At the start of the new millennia, it became clear that the scope of the First Directive was too narrow. 44 Accordingly, the EU introduced a broader Second Money Laundering Directive that expanded the list of predicate offences for which the suspicious transaction reports were compulsory. This new list ranged from drug trafficking offences to all serious criminal offences.
II. The Influence of 9/11
In 1994, the UN adopted the term "terrorist financing" through its Declaration to Eliminate International Terrorism. 45 Subsequently, a General Assembly Resolution called for Member States to "take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations."
46 Nevertheless, the scope of this Resolution was limited to terrorist bombings and nuclear terrorism. it. 49 Additionally, it is also important to consider UN Security Council Resolution 1267, which created a sanctions regime that targeted individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and/or the Taliban. Another important measure was UN Security Council Resolution 1269, which asked nation states to implement the UN's anti-terrorist conventions. More specifically, the Resolution provided that countries should, inter alia:
[P]revent and suppress in their territories through all lawful means the preparation and financing of any acts of terrorism; deny those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts safe havens by ensuring their apprehension and prosecution or extradition; take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts; [and] exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law, and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters in order to prevent the commission of terrorist acts . . . .
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a monumental shift in attitudes towards the detection and prevention of terrorist financing. The International Convention served as a precedent for UN Security Council Resolution 1373. This Resolution imposes four obligations on members of the UN: 51 (i) it specifically requires states to thwart and control the financing of terrorism; (ii) it criminalizes the collection of terrorist funds in states territory; (iii) it freezes funds, financial assets, and economic resources of people who commit or try to commit acts of terrorism; and (iv) it prevents any nationals within their territories from providing funds, financial assets, and economic resources to people who seek to commit acts of terrorism. 57 The Fourth Directive introduced several important amendments that included an alteration in the risk-based approach, new rules to deal with the threat posed by electronic money, registers for ultimate beneficial owners, and an improved sanctions regime. What becomes clear after briefly highlighting the response to the terrorist attacks in September 2001 is that the UN, FATF, and EU have continued to mistakenly use the profit-driven reporting model to tackle the financing of terrorism. The Article has thus far illustrated how the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 was unsuitable to prevent the 9/11 terrorists from acquiring the necessary finances via several wire transfers. The next Section of the Article provides more evidence demonstrating that the profit reporting model is inappropriate for tackling the financing of terrorism.
C. Sources of Terrorist Financing and Inexpensive Terrorism
The first part of this Section provides a commentary on the extensive number of sources that terrorists may exploit to fund their activities. Each of these sources has been designed to avoid having to interact with reporting entities. The second part of this Section concentrates on the increasing number of terrorist attacks that can be classified as inexpensive acts of terrorism.
I. Sources of Terrorist Financing
Preventing terrorist financing is difficult because of the large number of mechanisms that may be used to fund acts of terrorism. 58 of funding: State and private sponsors. 59 State sponsored terrorism refers to nation states providing logistical and financial support to terrorist organizations. 60 Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, state-sponsored acts of terrorism have declined and the trend has shifted to terrorists receiving funding from private sponsors or donors. 61 As acknowledged by the official report on the terrorist attacks on London on July 7, 2005, terrorist organizations have also become increasingly self-sufficient. 62 Terrorists generate funds through a broad spectrum of measures including kidnappings , robberies, and drug trading. 63 Other sources include counterfeiting 64 and the sale of conflict diamonds. 65 Terrorists have also acquired funding through traditional criminal activities, including benefit and credit card fraud, identity theft, the sale of counterfeit goods, and drug trafficking. 66 The wide range of sources available to terrorists is illustrated by the activities of ISIL, who have exploited four funding streams: The control of oil reserves, kidnappings, foreign and private financial benefactors, and antiquities. Another terrorist group that utilizes a vast array of sources is Al Shabaab, a Somali-based militant Islamist group that has obtained funding from the illegal smuggling of ivory. 67 Al Shabaab have "earned more than $25 million a year from illicit exports of charcoal to Gulf Arab states and from taxing the trucking of charcoal to the Somali ports of Kismayu and Barawe." 68 The UN reported that Al Shabaab receives a majority of its funding via charcoal exports and the illegal importation of contraband sugar.
Another example of a terrorist group that has been able to exploit a wide range of sources of funding are Boko Haram. Boko Haram are funded "through black market dealings, local and international benefactors, and links to al-Qa[e]da and other well-funded groups in the Middle East."
70 The Inter-governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa noted that Boko Haram has been partly financed through private donors and misapplied charitable donations. 71 The FATF provided several examples of how Boko Haram acquires its financing including the sale of goods and other lucrative activities, business profits/logistical support, extortion of civilians through intimidation, proceeds from arms smugglers and cash couriers, and financial contributions of political leaders. 72 The prevention and detection of terrorist financing is impossible. Such difficulties are partly due to the ability of terrorists to exploit an extensive array of financial resources that necessarily lie outside of the scope of reporting mechanisms. The extension of the profit-driven reporting model is unsuitable for the financing of terrorism because it is aimed at preventing legitimate entities from accepting deposits of proceeds from criminal activities. Terrorists are unlikely to deposit funds in a heavily regulated sector that is subject to reporting obligations.
II. Cheap Terrorism
In addition to the wide array of funding avenues available to terrorists, it is also important to discuss the concept of inexpensive terrorism. The threat posed by inexpensive terrorism was identified by Her Majesty's Treasury who took the view that the "UK experience bears out the relatively low costs required for an effective terrorist attack. The Bishopsgate bomb in the City of London in 1993 caused over £1bn worth of damage to property yet cost only £3,000 to mount." 73 Another example of inexpensive terrorism was the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, where six people were murdered and over 1,000 were injured at an estimated cost of only $400. This terrorist attack was "less devastating . . . because of the group's limited financial resources. amounted to $5,000. 75 The terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab on the Westgate Mall in Kenya "cost less than $5,000 to execute, and the materials used in the Boston Marathon bombings [in 2013] reportedly cost about $500." 76 The two explosive devices used by the bombers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, cost as little as $100 each. 77 In none of these terrorist attacks was there any evidence of a SAR submitted to a FIU by a reporting entity. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005, cost were estimated to have cost between £100 and £200. 78 Waszak estimated that "the cost of making a suicide bomb can be as low as $5, while the deployment of a suicide bomber including transportation and reconnaissance, can cost as little as $200."
79 Therefore, if the terrorist or terrorist cell is significantly self-sufficient, there is no need for them to be involved in funding activities that would lead to the submission of an SAR by a reporting entity.
More recently, there has been an increase in the number of inexpensive acts of terrorism within Members States of the EU. For example, in August 2017, a terrorist driving a van killed 13 people in Barcelona. In June 2017, one person was killed outside Finsbury Park Mosque in a terrorist attack, while terrorists killed eight others on London Bridge and Borough Market. A month before the terrorist attacks in London, 23 people were killed and 59 others were injured following a terrorist attack by a suicide bomber in Manchester. Additional terrorist attacks within the EU occurred in Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, Normandy, Nice, and Brussels. Several of these attacks have involved terrorists using a rental vehicle to target pedestrians. Of course, the relative ease of self-funding the renting of a vehicle provides further evidence that demonstrates how inexpensive forms of terrorism exploit loopholes in the profit reporting model. There are two common themes in these type of terrorist attacks: The use of low capability weapons and the relative inexpensiveness associated with such acts of terrorism. These two factors illustrate that extending the profit reporting model to tackle the financing of terrorism is unsuitable for achieving the intended goal. 86 The Terrorism Act makes it a criminal offense to fail to disclose knowledge or suspicion of another person that has committed an offense under the terrorist financing criminal offences. 87 Such a failure to disclose information is identical to the offense of failing to disclose information under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 88 An individual or organization who suspects that an offense has been committed under the Terrorism Act 2000 is legally required to complete a SAR. In addition to the traditional means of gathering financial intelligence via the use of SARs the Terrorism Act 2000 also contained a number of statutory measures related to financial information orders. For example, Schedule 6 of the Terrorism Act 2000 "deals with orders empowering the police to require financial institutions to supply customer information relevant to terrorist investigation." 89 An application for an order can be made by a police officer that could "require a financial institution [to which the order applies] to provide customer information for the purposes of the investigation." 90 The order could apply to "(a) all financial institutions, (b) a particular description, or particular descriptions, of financial institutions, or (c) a particular financial institution or particular financial institutions."
C. The United Kingdom
I. CTF Reporting Obligations
91 If a financial institution fails to comply with the financial information order it is guilty of a criminal offence. 92 The financial institution, however, does have a defense to breaching the financial information order when they can illustrate that "(a) that the information required was not in the institution's possession, or (b) that it was not reasonably practicable for the institution to comply with the requirement."
93 Additionally, the Terrorism Act 2000 permits the use of account monitoring orders. 94 Leong stated that an account monitoring order
[I]s an order that the financial institution specified in the application for the order must, for the period stated in the order, provide account information of the description specified in the order to an appropriate 1 1 8 4 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 19 No. 05 officer in the manner, and at or by the time or times, stated in the order.
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Judges can grant an account monitoring order if they are satisfied that "(a) the order is sought for the purposes of a terrorist investigation, (b) the tracing of terrorist property is desirable for the purposes of the investigation, and (c) the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investigation." 96 When an application is made for account monitoring, the order must contain information relating to accounts of the person who is subject to the order. 97 One of the most controversial pieces of CTF legislation is the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. The Act "has added to those financial provisions in significant ways. The Act implements a new regime of financial directions in Schedule 7 . . . the scheme is very wide-ranging in application and effect."
98 Goldby stated that the Counter-Terrorism Act "provides new antimoney laundering and counter-terrorism financing provisions applicable to the private sector."
99 Schedule 7 of the 2008 Act provides Her Majesty's Treasury with the ability to give a direction where the FATF has requested actions to be pursued against a country in which risks of terrorist financing or money laundering are present. Furthermore, Her Majesty's Treasury is permitted to impose an action where it reasonably believes that a country poses a significant risk of terrorist financing or money laundering to the UK. Finally, Her Majesty's Treasury may impose a direction where it believes there is substantial risk to the UK posed by the development, manufacturing, or facilitation of the development of nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons. The second part of Schedule 7 outlines the class of people that may become subject to the direction, which includes people working in the financial sector. Schedule 7 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 further provides the sort of obligations that can be imposed. For example, obligations can be imposed on transactions or business relationships where a person carries on business activities in the country or with the government of the country, or where the person is a resident of or incorporated in the country in which the business activities occur. Once a direction has been imposed pursuant to Schedule 7 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, the recipient will be required to improve their due diligence measures. Part 5 of Schedule 7 permits the relevant enforcement agency to obtain information and part 6 permits the use of financial sanctions on those who fail to 95 There are a number of other weaknesses that are associated with the reporting of suspicious transactions and the financing of terrorism. For example, one of the most common criticisms lies in the seemingly unsatisfactory approach that courts have taken with regard to the definition of the term "suspicion."
101 Courts have offered sparse guidance on the term as it relates to the money laundering reporting obligations imposed by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. For example, in the case of R v. Da Silva, the court stated that "the essential element of the word suspect and its affiliates, in this context, is that the defendant must think that there is a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that the relevant facts exist. A vague feeling of unease would not suffice."
102 Further guidance on the interpretation of suspicious activity is offered by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group who stated that: Suspicion has been defined by the courts as being beyond mere speculation and based on some foundation, for example: "[a] degree of satisfaction and not necessarily amounting to belief but at least extending beyond speculation as to whether an event has occurred or not . . . [and] [a]lthough the creation of suspicion requires a lesser factual basis than the creation of a belief, it must nonetheless be built upon some foundation." 109 There are a number of possible reasons for these increases. First, the increase may be directly attributable to the threat of sanctions by organizations like the Financial Conduct Authority, which has imposed a tactic upon the regulated sector that has been referred to as defensive or preventative' reporting. Second, reporting entities have complained about the significant increase in compliance costs, which has resulted in suggestions that the CTF reporting requirements could be abandoned and that resources should be redirected elsewhere
II. BREXIT
On June 24, 2016, the electorate determined that it no longer wanted the UK to be a member of EU. Will this decision have any impact on how the UK complies with the EU AML and CTF obligations? The UK is at the forefront of the international and regional efforts to tackle financial crime. The UK has implemented a number of international money laundering legislative instruments. For example, it signed the Vienna Convention in December 1988 that was then ratified in June 1991. 110 The impact of the Vienna Convention is illustrated by the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act (1990), part two of which is also entitled the Vienna Convention. Furthermore, the judiciary has taken the Vienna Convention into account on several occasions in relevant money laundering cases. Such cases include R v. Montila consistency between the practices of the UN and EU, and it seems highly unlikely that the UK will fail to guarantee its commitment to implementing the financial crime provisions. 
D. Conclusions and Recommendations
This Article was written during an unprecedented era of inexpensively financed acts of terrorism in the EU and its Member States. France has experienced a large number of inexpensive terrorist incidents that include the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher which resulted in the death of 17 people. In November 2015, eight terrorists instigated several concurrent acts of terrorism murdering 130 people and injuring 350 at a concert, an international football match, and at surrounding restaurants. Additionally, there were several terrorist attacks in Turkey associated with ISIL and the PKK. 126 UK citizens have been subjected to terrorist attacks in Sousse in 2015, the attempted murder of two train commuters in December 2015, and the terrorist attacks outlined in the second Section of this Article. Therefore, it is essential that the CTF reporting obligations become an effective mechanism for preventing terrorists from being able to move and access their funds. EUROPOL, however, concluded that "2016 has seen lower amounts of funds moved regularly through the financial sector. The Article thus provided a critical examination of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the use of the profit reporting model in the fight to suppress the financing of terrorism. The Article illustrated how the UN, FATF, and the EU have all introduced reporting mechanisms that aim to prevent money laundering in a wide range of institutions that receive deposits. The differences between money laundering and terrorist financing are clear and the profit model is inappropriate for tackling the financing of terrorism. Therefore, a new approach needs to be considered by the international community and the UK. The second part of the Article provides extensive evidence that illustrates that the CTF reporting obligations have done very little to prevent acts of terrorism from being financed. The wide variety of sources that terrorists use suggests that they obtain or transfer financing from resources that inherently lie outside the remit of the CTF reporting obligations. Detecting and preventing terrorist finances under the CTF reporting regime is thus extremely difficult if not impossible-especially considering the extensive financial tools available and the low costs of terrorist operations. The final part of the Article provides a commentary on the UKs efforts to implement the CTF reporting obligations. The UK has fully implemented the international AML and CTF reporting obligations that are outlined in the first part of the Article. Further, it is likely that Brexit will have a minimal effect on these obligations. Nevertheless, the UK has mistakenly adopted the profit or reporting model to fight the financing of terrorism. The Article accordingly highlights several weaknesses in this latter approach, including the inappropriate definition of suspicious, the increased costs of compliance, and a fear within reporting entities that has resulted in defensive reporting. To tackle the threat posed by terrorist financing, this Article suggests that reporting entities, FIUs, policy makers, and the international community adopt a different and innovative approach. Such an approach would involve revisiting the interpretation of suspicious and departing from a definition aimed at money launderers that attempt to disguise large sums of illegally obtained funds. Importantly, deposit taking institutions should focus their CTF obligations not on suspicious deposits that they receive, but on suspicious withdrawals. Such examples could include bank accounts that are closed with little or no notice, irregular cash withdrawals that are inconsistent with the financial character or behavior of the account holder, or an unexpected use of an overdraft. The scope of CTF reporting obligations must reach beyond institutions that receive deposits and should include providers of credit, especially considering the use of student loans to finance acts of terrorism in Manchester and Brussels. Extending reporting obligations to providers of credit could limit one funding avenue that has been previously exploited by terrorists. The success of such an approach would doubtlessly require a closer working relationship between the reporting entities themselves and the FIU.
